The National Security And Investment Act (NSIA) Received Royal Assent On 29 April 2021
It will usher in a new stand-alone national security vetting regime that will replace existing powers to scrutinise mergers on national security grounds. The Secretary of State for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS) will be the key decision maker, with significantly expanded powers to scrutinise and, where necessary, impose remedies on certain acquisitions and investments that have national security implications. The new regime will apply to investments/acquisitions by investors from any country, including the UK, and without any form of minimum turnover threshold or market share safe harbour.
The new regime will operate in full from 4 January 2022, when secondary legislation brings the NSIA fully into effect. Once operative, however, the NSIA may be applied retrospectively to certain transactions completed between 12 November 2020 (when the Bill was introduced to the House of Commons) and the commencement date.
WHAT HAS BEEN CHANGED FROM THE BILL?
The NSIA, as enacted, is in much the same form as it commenced as the Bill. This is despite disquiet from stakeholders over the retrospective call-in power and the breadth of its application which, it was thought, might diminish the UK's attractiveness to prospective investors.
One key change is that the lowest threshold for mandatory notification has been raised from 15% to 25%. However, the Secretary of State will still be able to call in acquisitions of shareholdings and voting rights that give the acquirer "material influence" over the target. BEIS refers to the definition of material influence which the CMA uses under the Enterprise Act 2002 for merger control. Material influence can arise out of shareholdings that are considerably lower than 25%, if combined with other interests such as a significant loan agreement between acquirer and target.
The other main substantive development is that, following consultation, the government has published a new statutory instrument setting out revised definitions of the seventeen sensitive sectors for which mandatory notification will be required. The revisions reflect calls from stakeholders for greater clarity in the definitions and for a more limited application of the legislation in certain sectors. Some sub-sectors have been removed entirely (e.g. subcontractors have been removed from the category of critical suppliers to government). Other definitions have been refined (the transport sector has been amended to only include those entities that pose the greatest potential risk to national security) or narrowed (the communications sector definition now focuses on public communications networks, and artificial intelligence now focuses on three higher risk applications: the identification of objects, people, and events; advanced robotics and cyber security, services and associated facilities). These definitions have been approved in regulations and are now set to take effect from 4 January 2022. Importantly, they will continue to be regularly reviewed by the Secretary of State. We expect some refinements to the exact areas that are of interest within each sector to emerge during 2022 with the potential for additional mandatory sectors to be declared if omissions are noted.
What does the NSIA do?
IMPACT AND NEXT STEPS
The Government’s Impact Assessment predicts 1,000 -1,830 notifications under the NSIA each year, with around 70 to 95 detailed national security assessments, resulting in around 8 – 10 remedies decisions although a range of industry participants have raised concerns that the broad nature of the mandatory sectors and the legislation as drafted will lead to far more notifications than anticipated.
The vast majority of transactions will be able to proceed as planned, without intervention by the Secretary of State. There will, however, be a significant number where the parties are required, or elect, to notify. The consequences of failing to notify where required to are severe – the transaction will be void (incurring risk for both purchaser and seller) and the purchaser may face civil and criminal sanctions for failing to obtain clearance. Our recent experience has raised a number of challenges including:
- The position taken by BEIS in its guidance to date that the regime will catch movement through the thresholds even where the change in control is intra-group (reflecting a difference in approach to merger control);
- The practical risks arising from failure to notify a transaction in a mandatory sector (and the impact on wider practical, financial and legal arrangements in the transaction); and
- Lenders seeking to satisfy themselves as to whether a transaction they are financing, such as a property purchase or a company acquisition, could trigger a review. Taking security over shares or assets would not normally trigger application of the NSIA, but it may become relevant in the event that the lender enforces the security. More importantly, the risk of a transaction being "void" for failure to make a mandatory notification may push lenders to take a more prudent view than is the case under merger control.
Businesses and investors should already be factoring the new regime into their deal plans, and including appropriate conditions in their agreements. This is especially important where the transaction concerns one of seventeen defined sectors. The acquirer should consider informing the ISU if a transaction may be at risk of retrospective call-in after the new regime comes into effect, in order to shorten the period in which the call-in power could be exercised. This will need to be coordinated closely with any merger control strategy.