THE NATIONAL SECURITY AND INVESTMENT ACT (NSIA) RECEIVED ROYAL ASSENT ON 29 APRIL 2021.
It will usher in a new stand-alone national security vetting regime that will replace existing powers to scrutinise mergers on national security grounds. The Secretary of State for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS) will be the key decision maker, with significantly expanded powers to scrutinise and, where necessary, impose remedies on certain acquisitions and investments that have national security implications. The new regime will apply to investments/acquisitions by investors from any country, including the UK, and without any form of minimum turnover threshold or market share safe harbour.
It is expected that the new regime will operate from the end of the year, when secondary legislation brings the NSIA fully into effect. Once operative, however, the NSIA may be applied retrospectively to certain transactions completed between 12 November 2020 (when the Bill was introduced to the House of Commons) and the commencement date.
WHAT HAS BEEN CHANGED FROM THE BILL?
The NSIA, as enacted, is in much the same form as it commenced as a Bill. This is despite disquiet from stakeholders over the retrospective call-in power and the breadth of its application which, it was thought, might diminish the UK's attractiveness to prospective investors.
One key change is that the lowest threshold for mandatory notification has been raised from 15% to 25%. However, the Secretary of State will still be able to call in acquisitions of shareholdings and voting rights that give the acquirer "material influence" over the target. As yet there is no formal definition of material influence but the same concept is used in UK merger control, where it can arise out of shareholdings considerably lower than 25%, when combined with other interests such as a significant loan agreement between acquirer and target.
The other main substantive development is that, following consultation, the government has published new draft revised definitions of the seventeen sensitive sectors for which mandatory notification will be required. The revisions reflect calls from stakeholders for greater clarity in the definitions and for a more limited application of the legislation in certain sectors. Some sub-sectors have been removed entirely (e.g. subcontractors have been removed from the category of critical suppliers to government). Other definitions have been refined (the transport sector has been amended to only include those entities that pose the greatest potential risk to national security) or narrowed (the communications sector definition now focuses on public communications networks, and artificial intelligence now focuses on three higher risk applications: the identification of objects, people, and events; advanced robotics and cyber security, services and associated facilities).
WHAT DOES THE NSIA DO?
IMPACT AND NEXT STEPS
The Government has said it will continue to refine the sector definitions for the mandatory regime over the coming months. Other regulations need to be in place before the new regime can take effect. This includes regulations giving details of the form and content of the notices envisaged by the NSIA. The Statement of Intent, describing how the Secretary of State expects to exercise the new call-in power and the three risk factors to be considered when deciding whether to use it, must also be laid before Parliament.
Once in force, the Government’s Impact Assessment predicts 1,000 -1,830 notifications under the NSIA each year, with around 70 to 95 detailed national security assessments, resulting in around 8 – 10 remedies decisions. This shows that the vast majority of transactions will be able to proceed as planned, without intervention by the Secretary of State. Nonetheless, there will be a significant number where the parties are required, or elect, to notify. The consequences of failing to notify where required to are severe – the transaction will be void (incurring risk for both purchaser and seller) and the purchaser may face civil and criminal sanctions for failing to obtain clearance.
Businesses and investors should already be factoring the new regime into their deal plans, and including appropriate conditions in their agreements. This is especially important where the transaction concerns one of seventeen defined sectors. The acquirer should consider informing the ISU if a transaction may be at risk of retrospective call-in after the new regime comes into effect, in order to shorten the period in which the call-in power could be exercised. This will need to be coordinated closely with any merger control strategy.
Lenders too will want to satisfy themselves whether a transaction they are financing, such as a property purchase or a company acquisition, could trigger a review. Taking security over shares or assets would not normally trigger application of the NSIA, but it may become relevant in the event that the lender enforces the security.
Businesses are already encouraged to seek guidance from BEIS on the application of the new regime, particularly transactions that are due to complete before the regime comes into effect and may be considered for retrospective call-in after that date. The good news is that the Government does not expect many transactions to be called in under this power – as of April this year none of the transactions reported to BEIS had raised substantive concerns. Prior to the enabling legislation coming into effect at the end of the year, BEIS is aiming to deal with any informal approaches that it receives within the same 30 day timeframe that will ultimately apply under the NSIA.