On 1 October 2021, the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”) published its Mutual Evaluation Report of South Africa, which report detailed the findings of the FATF’s “comprehensive review” of the effectiveness of South Africa’s anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (“AML/CTF”) measures. The Mutual Evaluation Report identified a number of deficiencies in South Africa’s AML/CTF regulatory and enforcement environment which required remediation in order for South Africa to comply with the FATF Recommendations. A failure to remedy these deficiencies put South Africa at risk of being placed on the FATF’s list of “Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring”, the so-called “grey-list”. Faced with the prospect of “grey-listing”, a number of legislative amendments received Presidential assent during December 2022. These amendments sought to remedy, amongst others, one of the key deficiencies identified by the FATF, being the lack transparency in respect of beneficial ownership of legal persons in South Africa.
Whilst the South African government ultimately failed to prevent South Africa from being placed on the “grey list”, the steps taken to increase beneficial ownership transparency are nevertheless welcomed. Of particular interest are the amendments to the Companies Act, 2008 (“the Companies Act”) requiring all companies to record beneficial ownership information in some form[1]. The term “beneficial owner” has been defined broadly in the Companies Act to cover, amongst others, individuals who are holders of beneficial interests as well as those individuals who are able to exercise different forms of control over the company concerned (e.g. voting rights etc.) even where such control is exercised “through a chain of ownership or control”. Based on the foregoing, it appears that determining who will fall within this expansive definition may be challenging in the context of more convoluted ownership and control structures.
In addition to introducing the above record-keeping requirements, access to beneficial ownership information is sought to be enhanced by requiring companies to submit copies of their securities register and beneficial interest register (where such information is not included in the securities register) together with their annual return to the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (“the Commission”). In addition, the draft Companies Regulations, which were published for public comment on 10 March 2023, include a provision requiring the Commission to provide electronic access: (i) to any person to view copies of a company’s annual returns; and (ii) to copies of electronic documents filed together with an annual return to “such persons and on such conditions as may be determined by the Commission after consultation with the Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition and the Financial Intelligence Centre…”. Exactly who “such persons” will be remains to be seen but it seems that law enforcement agencies and other relevant bodies are likely candidates. The success of these changes will ultimately depend on the extent to which the Commission is able to exercise effective supervision to ensure compliance and this will likely only become clear in the coming years. Notwithstanding this, the changes are at least illustrative of a policy direction of enhancing transparency, which is welcomed.
As outlined above, these and other legislative amendments were introduced in an attempt to avoid “grey-listing”. Whilst this end was not achieved and more will be required to get South Africa removed from the “grey-list”, comfort may at least be sought that the benefits of these changes may be enjoyed in the interim. In particular, enhanced access to beneficial ownership information should facilitate more robust counterparty due diligence. Whilst FATF’s primary focus is on combating AML/CTF and customer due diligence, access to beneficial ownership information is also of incredible importance in the context of supply chain due diligence. Supply chain due diligence may be conducted for a variety of purposes depending on the potential risks prevalent in a particular supply chain. For example, supply chain due diligence may be conducted to determine the existence of risks in respect of engaging with entities which are: (i) sanctioned; (ii) known to have a history of human rights abuses; or (iii) politically exposed. To conduct effective supply chain due diligence, it will typically be necessary (as far as possible) to go beyond a surface-level assessment of the identified legal persons in the supply chain and to also examine the “warm bodies” involved. It is in this context that transparency in respect of beneficial ownership is critical, and implementing mandatory beneficial ownership disclosure requirements should (if effectively enforced) facilitate more robust supply chain due diligence in South Africa.
Adrian Roux - ENSafrica